Markets often feel like a newswire in a windstorm, with headlines whipping past, up-/downgrades piling up, and your the media’s preferred guru confidently calling Bitcoin’s price three months out. Meanwhile, if you manage to shut out the noise and diligently flip through the news flow (I like mfn.se for the Nordics), you occasionally catch something interesting the market hasn’t fully digested.
This is particularly relevant when screening for special situations, which tend to reside in the quiet corners of the market. For that same reason, conviction cannot be borrowed - your work must carry the weight.
In this post, I share my thinking on a few special situations in Denmark that I am monitoring (or already own). If readers find value in this format, I’ll consider making it a reoccurring series - I have a few up the sleeve in Sweden and Finland too.
Oh… and merry Christmas!
#1 - Fast Ejendom Danmark (CPSE:FED)
TLDR: Orderly liquidation trading at ~40% discount to NAV. Watchlisted.
Fast Ejendom Danmark (“FED”) is a Copenhagen-based investor in real estate assets, including offices (41% of property value), logistics (43%) and other (16%). In late October 2025, the company announced a strategy to undergo an orderly liquidation, citing persistent detachment between reported NAV and the market capitalization.
Shares shot up +30% on announcement and have continued to climb higher in recent weeks. The discount to NAV now sits at ~40%. Question is if that is attractive from an IRR perspective. Before diving into that, a quick comment on the NAV itself.
As with any other DCF valuation, the NAV assessment is subject to management discretion. Property values are derived from (i) the expected future cash flows a given property is expected to yield, discounted by (ii) a required rate of return that reflects asset-specific risks. FED applies a weighted average discount rate of 6.3%, which I believe is fair in lieu of the property types, utilization rates (~90%), their geographical position1, and available peer info for overlapping locations.
The company’s balance sheet is decent with an equity ratio of ~44%, and 2/3 of the debt fixed for five years or longer. The residual 1/3 is floating, linked to 6m CIBOR, and introduces an element of interest rate risk but not it is concerning, in my view. Having said that, higher rates will inevitably drive down NAV so its not like you walk entirely free from duration risk.
Speaking of duration risk, real estate (especially outside Copenhagen) does not sell like hot bread. Management has, perhaps wisely, refrained from providing an exact timeline for the wind-down, aside from a more general “over the coming years”. After all, operations are cash flow positive - i.e., there is no urgency to get properties off the books per se. Still, there is an unknown - timing, both in terms of what assets get sold first and the overall timetable - which investors must get comfortable with.
I believe the below sensitivity table does a decent job summarizing the case.
Given the full value realization path is likely longer-dated (i.e., at least 2 years, in my view), I believe there are better opportunities elsewhere at these levels. However, I will monitor the situation closely in hopes of a reversal back to ~190/share area.
#2 - Schouw & Co (CPSE:SCHO)
TLDR: A HoldCo pursuing an IPO its largest holding to unlock hidden value.
Founded in 1878, Schouw & Co is an industrial conglomerate with six holdings, operated independently (limited synergies). In an effort to surface the underlying value of the Group, the company has mandated banks to explore a potential IPO of its largest holding, BioMar - the world’s third-largest producer of high-quality feed for farmed fish and shrimp with 17 facilities in 13 countries.
The IPO, scheduled for H1’26, is rumored to fetch a valuation (EV) north of DKK 15bn, corresponding to ~13x EBIT (2026E, mid-point of guide). For context, analysts are working with DKK 12-13bn EV in their SOTP models, equivalent to an equity value impact of DKK 110/share, all else equal. That’s a ~20% differential versus the current share price - i.e., nothing to get excited about just yet, but worth tracking nonetheless.
The company intends to retain a majority stake of BioMar post listing, and “proceeds from a potential listing are expected to be reinvested in the portfolio business, with the possibility of expanding through a new platform investment”. When questioned as to whether management has any platform investments in pipeline, the response is clear - they “do not have anything specific at the table”. As such, the extent to which investors will benefit from a distribution of proceeds will largely depend on (i) valuation and (ii) post-listing ownership share.
With market appetite still running hot and BioMar performing well, I would not expect any major pushback on the DKK 15bn valuation. However, worth noting that MOWI were in market with its feed division, with no deal completed - i.e., could be that appetite is in fact limited.
I will park this here and monitor for any events, reversion in share price, etc. In the meantime, I intend on digging more into the business - my familiarity with SCHO is still limited.
#3 - SKAKO (CPSE:SKAKO)
TLDR: A late-stage liquidation trading at 20% discount to net cash. Owned.
I have covered this opportunity in detail in a separate post (linked below). Recent developments, however, warrant an update. Readers who are not yet familiar with the situation are encouraged to review the original piece first.
Friday after market close, controlling shareholder Frederik2 ApS - owned by the CEO (C. Jørgensen) and Chairman (J. Willumsen) - announced a mandatory offer at DKK 49.80/share after crossing the 33% ownership-/voting threshold on the back of acquiring a 9.9% stake from Danica Pension at that same price. For context, the stock closed the session at DKK 51.60/share.
Mind you, SKAKO is a shell with DKK ~64/share in net cash, of which DKK ~47/share (mid-point of communicated range) will be returned to shareholders beginning of next year. The stub (DKK ~17/share) will remain on balance so as to backstop any warranty claims from “LegacyCo.” It doesn’t take a genius to know that the two gentlemen have struck a good deal - kudos. As for Danica Pension, the gap in financial judgment is hard to ignore…
As for the stub, I continue to believe SKAKO could transfer the residual warranty-tail exposure to a third party, enabling a full wind-down materially ahead of schedule. Nordic banks’ appetite for such risk transfers - warehousing guarantee risks, packaging it, skimming a few bps, and offloading to counterparties such as Atradius - has been notably forward-leaning in recent years.
While the mandatory offer is procedural in nature, there is a risk that minority investors get their hands tied. That risk to a large extent depends on whether Maj Invest (9.8% stake) walks in the shoes of Danica and accepts the bid. Such scenario would leave the final outcome in the hands of a fragmented shareholders base comprising the remaining ~50% stake.
What could possibly motivate Maj Invest to accept? My best guess is rooted more in practicality than valuation. In the unlikely event that no financial institution is willing to assume the warranty risks (or customers willing to change terms), the final wind-down will be dragged out, leaving them effectively pinned down with a rounding-error-position in an illiquid shell for years. Difficult to say, but definitely not out of the question. That implies rejecting a “worst case”2 IRR at ~14%, excluding any returns on the stub.
I will keep my shares (full disclosure, I added to my position prior to the bid) and intend to vote against the offer.
#4 - Asetek (CPSE:ASTK)
TLDR: A takeover trading at ~8% spread to bid. IRR potential of ~60%. Owned.
Note: I wrote this a few weeks ago. The spread has now halved, i.e., R/R not as attractive anymore. Formal bid was launched December 19.
Asetek is a Copenhagen-listed (DKK 80m MCAP) provider of Denmark-based provider of (i) Liquid Cooling solutions for computer hardware (88% of LTM sales), posting +30% EBITDA margins; and (ii) SimSports equipment (12%) which is draining cash. The company has also dipped its toes into the data center space, though it formally exited the space in 2021.
Recent industry-wide softness in gaming has put pressure on topline development and margins-/cash generation were challenged by a series of strategic missteps, mainly related to poor capital allocation - throwing good money (liquid cooling) after bad (SimSports). In late 2024, this culminated in with a covenant breach for which the company had to raise a minimum DKK 60m in new equity to cure. With a company practically on its knees, the management-/board still had the audacity to ask for DKK ~115m in new equity - with the residual (DKK 55m) earmarked for investments into… you guessed it; SimSports. Mind you, the market cap at the time was DKK ~60m, and its not like investors had great confidence in management’s capital allocation3. The company wound up raising DKK 88m with limited investor appetite.
The near term equity story became even harder to parse when the company announced two diverging messages within a three-day timespan. On April 25, Asetek lowered its 2025 guidance (mainly related to SimSports) on the back of Trump’s tariffs. On April 28, the company announced a major “milestone” when it landed an agreement with a leading Nordic electronics retailer for its SimSports products.
All throughout this tumultuous period, a tug-of-war between activists4 and the existing board-/management were building, and ultimately resulted in the entire board getting overturned at the AGM. This is likely what has brought this special situation to light.
On November 25, Asetek shareholders received a DKK 1.72/share all-cash takeover offer from China-based Chunqiu; a premium of ~110% to the prior-day close or ~156% L12M VWAP. Shares currently trade at DKK 1.59/share, implying an 8% deal spread. At least 38.5% of shareholders have accepted the offer; supported by the activist block, which held a combined ~33% at announcement and has continued to add, as evidenced by subsequent insider trade disclosures5. That alone suggests that better-informed investors (i.e., by virtue of their capacity as board members) believe there is limited execution risk.
The spread is partly explained by the lack of a formal bid - expected to land no later than December 23 🎅. Yet, the market is likely also discounting:
Acceptance risks from retail “diamond-hand” owners who will be forced to face reality.
ATP (13% stake) blocking the deal.
Regulatory tail risk given the buyer is Chinese and Asetek’s (rather unsuccesful) stint in the datacenter space.
The first two are tough to handicap, though I would expect ATP to see this as a good opportunity to get rid of a headache. As for regulatory risks, there is a bigger likelihood that Asetek will pass as a toy-maker than any critical infrastructure. In that context, the tail risk pertains mainly to a potential call for review that could drag out the process - which is quite unlikely anyway, in my view.
I have a smaller position - reflective of my assessment of deal certainty/risk - in Asetek at DKK 1.58/share. For what it’s worth, I screened the company earlier this year, and rejected due to, inter alia, lumpy sales, significant supplier/customer concentration, and poor capital allocation. Hence, this is purely a merger arbitrage play; I plan on exiting before the spread is fully closed, which hopefully happens when the formal bid lands.
#5 - North Media (CPSE:NORTHM)
TLDR: Deep value on paper but governance discount in practice. Pass.
To be fair, this is not a special situation - but it is indeed an unusual situation in this neck of the woods. While it has the potential of becoming a no-brainer case, the key ingredient for such outcome is missing; shareholder alignment. Still, North Media is increasingly tossed around as a “no-brainer” opportunity in the online investing community. Below I unpack why the case is, admittedly, tempting but equally dull.
North Media is a founder-controlled conglomerate with two operating segments: (i) legacy print and last-mile distribution of magazines, supermarket leaflets, and similar formats; and (ii) a digital portfolio spanning the leading domestic apartment-rental marketplace alongside more opportunistic, venture-style assets. Perhaps paradoxically, the core operations are the least interesting part of the story. All you need to know is that the Group is not burning cash.
The more exciting part of North Media is its balance sheet. The company holds a stock portfolio worth DKK ~840m6 more than its own market capitalization (DKK ~740m), real estate at cost (DKK 242m BV), and limited debt (DKK 136m) mainly in the form of mortgages.
Any investor is right to scratch their head when looking at this. It looks like a no-brainer on the surface, but the uncomfortable truth is North Media has been this way for a long while - having tested the patience of many (mainly Danish) investors for ages. In that context, it makes sense why the enthusiasm for NORTHM in the “fintwit” community is overwhelmingly driven by Norwegian and Swedish investors.
Founder and majority shareholder (~57%), Richard Bunck is the gatekeeper of the returns said investors are underwriting. The obvious question - why doesn’t he exploit the situation and launch a takeover offer or buy back shares? After all, there is lots of headroom to give before a premium eats into his golden egg. The answer is (probably) because he doesn’t have to. I have never spoken to the guy, but the stories I’ve heard doesn’t suggest he cares one bit about your input as a “shareholder”.
Having said all that, recent events could indicate something is brewing. Only issue is, I don’t know if it is for better or worse:
CEO stepped down in April 2025 on mutual agreement
CFO stepped down in September 2025 due to sickness
Chairman will step down in 2026 on mutual agreement
Ofir, a marketplace for jobs, was sold to peer JobIndex in January 2025
An investment property was sold in March 2025
At this stage, the only credible - and perhaps dystopian - catalyst to unlock value is biological (Mr. Bunck is 86 years old), and not something anyone should be comfortable underwriting.
During peak euphoria in 2022, the company decided to commence construction of its new HQ - 14,500m² domicile costing DKK +300m. Also, perhaps not the greatest signal of conviction that founder & CEO, André Eriksen, who built this house and put supercars in the parking lot, decided to only contribute DKK 300k in the share issue.
Assuming DKK 47/share dividend in Apr’26, DKK -8m warranty headwind, zero contribution on generated returns from cash (stub), and final wind-down end of 2031.
Nordic Compound Invest, Skjold Invest and Vorup Invest
https://mfn.se/all/a/asetek
P. 20 of Q3 provides a list of all properties
Assuming no changes to its portfolio post Q3 report
Number 5 has me very interested but i would need to pair it with a life insurance policy for arbitrage 😅